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Replies
Joseph Margolis
1 My general impression, reading my commentators reading Pragmatism Ascendent, is that,
however generous and patient they may be, they would like to have a clear statement of
my sense of my own standing as a pragmatist vis-à-vis Kant and Hegel. Rosa Calcaterra
has caught the book’s essential thrust – the last of a series on pragmatism’s second life,
that were never intended to run on as a single study – that begin, opportunistically, with
the rather inconclusive dispute between Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam,  the most
prominent  self-styled  pragmatists  of  their  day,  debating  aimlessly  in  a  philosophical
desert from about the late 70s to the end of the century. The books remain alert, however,
to the developing “exclusion [as Calcaterra reports] of pragmatism from the higher levels
of philosophical debate,” a subliminal policy of sorts already underway quite early in the
20th century;  they then acknowledge (as  they must)  the decline and near demise of
pragmatism itself  from the  late  40s  through the  70s,  a  kind  of  self-imposed  retreat
beginning close  to  the  end of  John Dewey’s  life;  they  go  on to  record a  completely
gratuitous reprieve and a suddenly robust second life, deprived of the least sign of fresh
undertakings forceful enough to explain that improbability; and then, at last, something
of a possible opening appears in the new millennium encouraging a new beginning, cast
in terms of a rereading of pragmatism’s Kantian/Hegelian inspiration (which others have
also sensed) that might be prophetically directed to a larger future, the true sense of
which I’ve glimpsed, eccentrically, in a chance motto drafted by Peirce himself, which I
trust  Pragmatism  Ascendent  will  help  to  explicate:  that  is,  ‘Darwinizing  Hegel  and
Hegelianizing Darwin.’ I don’t believe the most promising reading of the motto is likely to
be easily guessed at the moment. That is, the sense of the motto. Not the sense Peirce
might have favored, though a sense entirely congruent (I would say) with the promise of
Peirce’s  own  contribution  suitably  reinterpreted.  I  should  also  add  to  Calcaterra’s
recollection the plain truth that any attempt to redeem pragmatism in terms restricted to
the achievements of its classic figures would only hasten the movement’s end. The record
spanning the late 40’s to the 70’s provides the evidence.
2 The theme that seems to have puzzled my commentators most concerns a heterodox
reading of  the treatment of  realism and idealism,  read back as  a  solution of  certain
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stalemates within the Kantian/Hegelian setting, drawn chiefly from Peirce’s distinctive
speculations.  It  is indeed the key to the novelty of the reorientation I  have in mind.
Roberto Gronda is distinctly wary about my notion of the ‘indissoluble union of realism
and idealism.’ So I must make its meaning clear. Gronda favors, if I read him correctly,
Kant’s joint advocacy of ‘transcendental idealism and empirical realism’ – that is, two
separate accounts of the same state of affairs – which I fear, taken in Kant’s sense, proves
incoherent. Gronda also has doubts about my use of the terms ‘transcendental’ and ‘a
priori’  and  my  heterodox  reading  of  ‘constructivism’  intended  to  service  the
(indissoluble) realism/Idealism thesis – according to which, ‘transcendental’ is not to be
read as ‘transcendentalist’ or ‘apriorist,’ as in Kant’s usage. (A barbarous invention!) I
won’t pretend that I haven’t taken liberties with Kant’s conceptions. Of course I have. But,
Hegel had already found it impossible to support Kant’s transcendentalism in the very
process of co-opting his transcendental questions under the transformative conditions of
evolving history.
3 More to the point, I take Kant to have equivocated on the concept of an ‘object’ –and to be
unable to provide a criterial distinction between two very different concepts (both of
which he means), as well as a rule by the use of which to pass reliably from the one to the
other: that is, first, regarding ‘objects’ conceived to be sensibly intuited as unifying some
manifold of intuited qualities (a use Gronda emphasizes, drawn from the first Critique);
the other, regarding ‘objects’ conceived in the first sense but now able to count as well
(somehow) as independent things, things not confined to our own minds (which play an
important  role,  for  instance,  in  the  proposed  refutation  of  idealism).  Think  here  of
Macbeth’s ‘seeing’ a dagger before him.
4 Gronda is aware of the two uses, of course; but he apparently believes (in accord with
Kant’s idealism), that the first use is sufficient to accommodate the second. (He admits
that Kant failed to formulate a ‘consistent idealism.’) But I honestly don’t find that he
addresses the seeming difficulty that the first use speaks of objects confined subject-ively
to the mind and the second (still mysteriously) permits us to speak of objects no longer
thus confined, though still within the terms of an idealism presumably freed of Kant’s
inconsistent formulation. (I don’t believe it can be done.) There’s the fatal weakness of
Kant’s  dual  idiom  of  transcendental  idealism  and  empirical  realism;  the  intended
advantage of my heterodox replacement (realism/Idealism); and the essential charge of
Hegel’s original critique of Kant. It’s entirely possible, of course, that I’ve misread Gronda.
5 Sami Pihlström, I venture to say, requires a fuller statement of my treatment of realism
and  idealism.  He  clearly  sees  that  I  reject  what  Kant  rejects,  what  Kant  calls
‘transcendental  realism,’  as  well  as  what  Putnam calls  ‘metaphysical  realism,’  all  the
while I favor a constructivist form of realism that “accepts the idea that there is […] a
reality  independent  of  us,”  viewed  solely  from  human  perspectives.  Pihlström  is
cautiously open to my preferring Hegel to Kant, though I believe he takes me to have
misread Kant’s resources in the first Critique: he signals (so it seems) that I might have
secured  my  own  claims  within the  bounds  of  Kant’s  vision.  (On  my  view,  Kant’s
transcendental idealism ultimately requires what he names transcendental realism.) He
also chides me mildly for having ‘neglected’ James’s contribution to ‘the development of
the pragmatic method’ and its distinctive application to the realism issue.
6 I, however, am quite persuaded that Kant, committed to his ‘transcendental idealism,’
found it impossible to pass from subjective (or mental) appearings to empirically real
things without investing (fatally, I would say) in some form of ‘transcendental realism,’
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which was surely a doctrine he strenuously opposed. But the charge regarding James is
entirely just: James’s ‘temperament’ is always attractive; but I confess he foils my every
effort to read what he says, wherever I look for a pertinently sustained argument on the
realism issue – for instance, in Radical Empiricism and A Pluralistic Universe.
7 Kant, I daresay, never met his deepest worries successfully, the most decisive ones, for
instance, that he shared with Marcus Herz before the publication of the first Critique: the
reason lies, it seems to me, with his unnecessary insistence on the complete passivity of
what  is  ‘given’  as  the  ‘effects’  of  unknown  external factors,  on  which  all  empirical
knowledge (which should rightly read: all knowledge) depends. Kant thereby entrenches
a  stubborn dualism that  he  cannot  overcome ‘this  side’  of  the  subject-ive/object-ive
divide.  He cannot,  I  think (as  Hegel  clearly signals,  in his  lectures on the history of
philosophy),  extend  the  resources  of  his  “transcendental  idealism”  to  cover  our
knowledge  of  objective,  independent  things,  without  yielding  to  the  (unacceptably)
privileged claims of ‘transcendental realism,’ which he means to defeat utterly. Had he
favored the thrust of Hegel’s critique, he would have had to construe his categories in
terms of the joint play of object-ive as well as subject-ive elements. Kant never completes
the  argument  he  envisages.  He  couldn’t  have,  without  displacing  the  entire  Critique.
(Think  of  the  ‘refutation  of  idealism.’)  Hegel’s  contribution,  which,  as  I  say,  I  read
genealogically, construes ‘appearings’ as ‘appearances-of-things-present-in-experience’ (
Erscheinungen):  what,  therefore,  is  ‘given’  in  (active)  experience  and  perception,
presuppositionlessly, however qualified by reason’s (or the mind’s) engagement in the
middle of  our reflections,  without privilege of  any kind (without strict  necessities or
universalities), invites (in fact, requires) the continual redefinition as what to count as an
ampler picture of the ‘objects’ of our experience, as we review as much of our evolving
thought and experience as we grasp.
8 I regard Hegel’s method as marking a profound revision (and recovery) of the essential
point of Kant’s transcendental question, shorn of Kant’s transcendentalism, under the
condition of historied experience, well on its way (by strategies potentially superior to
the  fiddling  of  both  Peirce  and  Cassirer)  toward  a  naturalistic  rendering  of  the
‘transcendental’  (or its  surrogates),  addressed to the infinite openness of  inquiries of
every kind governed or guided by considerations of truth and reality. (An anticipation, in
effect,  of fallibilism.) Peirce’s phenomenology (or phaneroscopy) is itself a pragmatist
variant of what Hegel intended by the phenomenologically ‘given.’ The ‘given,’ which is
given presuppositionlessly,  may be continually reinterpreted or reconstructed,  in the
search for an adequate account of what is real — a thoroughly meaningful world, we may
say; but what we abstract as the merely physical need not be said to be itself constructed
in the process. With the reconstruction of our ‘pictures’ of the world, we may consistently
construct an account of ‘that world’s’ independent existence. I see no fatal dualism there
– and nothing lost. Realism is meant to be a picture of reality, not reality itself. It’s for
this reason that I dwell on Peirce’s fallibilism more than on Dewey’s theorizing economies
(possibly more useful, finally, then Peirce’s strenuous story); James has nothing to say
about  Hegel’s  critique of  Kant.  But  once we’re clear  about  the genealogy,  there’s  no
particular reason we can’t allow this part of Peirce’s theory (and Cassirer’s neo-Kantian
mate) to yield up its control of pragmatism’s center stage.
9 Western philosophy (particularly what I call ‘Eurocentric philosophy’ – ‘modern modern’
philosophy) begins with Kant’s efforts to defeat continental rationalism and dogmatism
and  ‘transcendental  realism.’ The  trouble  is,  Kant  was  always  in  danger  of  being
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recaptured  by  the  metaphysical  ‘realists,’  in  meeting  the  dawning  needs  of  his  own
transcendental idealism. I say he fails in this; and (of course) Hegel ‘warns’ him much too
late to be of any help. What I believe I’ve come to appreciate in Peirce’s fallibilism is his
invention of a viable form of realism/Idealism that bridges, seemingly for the first time,
the excessive economies of the empiricists and the extravagances of the transcendentalist
Kant. This is the burden of Peirce’s grand intuitions regarding ‘abductive Hope,’ which I
read in Hegelian terms, though it remains unclear what Peirce’s debt to Hegel finally is.
Nevertheless,  once  we  gain  this  lesson,  we  see  that  there  cannot  be  any  facultative
division  between  sensory  perception  and  experience  and  thought  or  reason.  The
pragmatists  have the additional  advantage of  their  viewing the human animal  along
Darwinian (more precisely: post-Darwinian) lines. There’s a very good reason, there, for
refusing the fantastic extravagances of transcendental idealism, particularly where it is
tempted to borrow – what it cannot legitimately reach from its own resources – from
those of transcendental realism.
10 Let me say straight out that I’ve read the figures I principally discuss, as advocates of
particular doctrines that confront my own commitments in important ways; but I don’t
report their views in order to make the best case for any standard reading of their views. I
read them, rather, as congenial or uncongenial to a defense of a viable pragmatism for
our time, consistently (as far as possible) with the main thrust of their actual texts. I
regard my readings of Kant, Hegel, and Peirce (chiefly) as a sort of genealogy skewed (not
unfairly,  I  hope)  for  the  sake  of  a  strengthened  and  redirected  pragmatism for  the
present future. Hence, I make the best case for challenging the realist reading of Peirce;
and  I  try  to  show  how  the  inherent  bafflements  of  Kant’s  transcendentalism  are
unproductive, unnecessary, and distinctly inhospitable to pragmatist concerns.
11 My Hegelian reading of  Kant  is  meant  to  show how historicizing the transcendental
question,  while  abandoning  transcendentalism  altogether,  would  relieve  Kant  of  an
impossible task and enable him to ‘anticipate’ Hegel, Peirce, and Cassirer (in different
ways) and even our present needs and undertakings. I’m quite willing to concede that
Cassirer’s variant of the endless run of inquiry in the sciences is far leaner and more apt
in methodologically explicit ways than Peirce’s fallibilism (as I’ve tried to demonstrate).
Yet it  remains Peirce who is the best champion of a constructivist realism within an
Idealist (not an idealist or subjectivist) account of inquiry concerned with truth-claims. In
short, I take realism/Idealism as an improvement over Kant’s conjunction of empirical
realism  and  transcendental  Idealism:  Kant  cannot  quite  secure  his  realism,  and  the
idealism is already (or is on its way to being) a form of transcendentalism.
12 Nevertheless, I  do oppose the ‘separability thesis’ (in the sense of P. F. Strawson’s The
Bounds of Sense and in the views of strong commentators like Paul Guyer, who yields to
Strawson):  ‘transcendental  idealism,’  though a  form of  transcendentalism,  cannot  be
excised from the first  Critique without  dismembering it  completely.  (Henry Allison is
certainly right about that.) For similar reasons, we must accept the ‘discursivity thesis’
(in Kant’s account of cognition and in our own: that is, that the analysis of cognition
requires, as Allison affirms, ‘both concepts and (sensible) intuitions.’ (I believe Allison
coined both terms.) Similarly, if the a priori is construed (say) as the science of what is
‘transcendentally necessary,’  then it  is already ‘apriorist’  or ‘transcendentalist’  – and,
thus,  incompatible with pragmatism. Otherwise,  the ‘a priori’  may be treated in an a
posteriori way, as a conjecture about the conditions of possibility of this or that sort of
inquiry: hence, as resting on what may be contingently projected from perceptual and
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experiential sources that our enabling concepts and categories themselves rely on (but
cannot and need not be confined to). The key problem concerns the source of ‘concepts’
and ‘categories.’ Allison may not be entirely consistent here.
13 Kant never succeeds (never could) in ‘converting’ appearances into independent things; if
he had, he would (on my reading) have had to adopt a form of ‘transcendental realism,’
which would have violated (as well) his insistence that space and time are never more
than subject-ive forms of human perception and experience. (I don’t see how that notion
could possibly be a synthetic a priori truth.) Kant never provides an adequate distinction
between  noumena  and  things  “independent  of  the  mind”  (though  not  noumena).
Accordingly,  he  has  no  way  to  distinguish  between  representations  and  what
representations  represent  in  the  external  world.  (The  subject-ive  version  is  either
redundant or confines knowledge to a constructed reality of its own invention.) Still, in
favoring Hegel over Kant, it may be entirely fair to say that it’s only when Hegel’s own
argument is rendered in naturalistic terms that its distinctive rigor and advantage may be
rightly grasped.
14 Furthermore, if (as I believe) it’s best to adopt some form of the realist/Idealist option
(though not for apriorist reasons), then it’s a simple matter to deny that the ‘external
world’ we claim to know is itself constructed when we conjecture, by constructivist
hypotheses, whatever we take to be the true nature of the world (that ‘part’ of the world).
The external  world is  not  a  noumenal  world,  though it  is  a  world whose nature we
surmise we know through our hypotheses (or ‘pictures’), which (according to our lights)
we count, however provisionally, as true or false. Here, again, Peirce’s ‘long run’ explains
why there is no redundancy or dualism or fatal form of representationalism to be excised.
15 However, it is true, and my commentators are entirely justified in noting, that I have not
sought  to  explain  (here)  the  linkage  between  normative  considerations  (truth  and
rationality as well as moral and aesthetic value) – or culturally enlanguaged meaning and
significance – and the realist/Idealist thesis I explore primarily with an eye to laying a
proper ground for objective claims about the ‘external world.’  I’ve tried my hand, in
numerous settings, at resolving some of the largest puzzles of that enormous issue. I have
no intention of ignoring any of that. But if I may say so, I take the complaint to be a sort
of  compliment  –  a  kindly  impatience to  get  on with the rest  of  the story!  So many
discussants have fallen short in these matters that I must take care to shape the argument
correctly.  May I  say that,  in my own view, the answer rests with the analysis of the
hybrid,  natural  artifactuality  of  the  human  self.  There’s  the  essential  theme  of  the
continuing inquiry that I hope, in time, to share with you.
16 There are, also, deeper infelicities confronting Kant’s system that I hope to avoid. The
very distinctions between empirical and transcendental concepts (candidates for what,
on Kant’s view, would be regarded as transcendentally necessary) seems to be no more
than a  promissory note that  Kant  can never completely redeem.  Think,  here,  of  the
uncertainty  of  ever  discerning  any  demonstrably  invariant  concept  of  causality  or
nomologicality or even of what may be supposed to be ‘an independent object,’ or the
completely adequate form of a ‘rule’ by which judgment serves the essential function of
the understanding.
17 Answers to any of these ‘transcendental questions’ I take to be provisional conjectures –
thoroughly rational in their way but impossible to confirm in the strong form Kant claims
for them. They remain defeasible, but not (perhaps) by dint of rigorous argument. Indeed,
I  take them to be cousins of  Peirce’s  abductive Hope.  Philosophy trails  off  here into
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something deeper and more informal – and, I believe, caught up with larger currents of
changing cultural conviction. I cannot do justice to the issue that’s a-dawning here, and I
haven’t got this part of my speculation sufficiently worked out. But for what it’s worth,
reading Kant, Hegel, Peirce, Dewey, and Cassirer with an eye to pragmatism’s ‘recovery,’ I
find  Wittgenstein  (or  my  reading  of  Peirce’s  fallibilism  in  Wittgensteinian  terms)
particularly convincing: our medium-sized philosophical arguments begin to be judged
more and more in terms of  their  accord with the deepest  abductive instincts of  our
Lebensform. It’s in some such sense that I believe Peirce’s extravagant version of fallibilism
may  reasonably  yield  to  something  closer  to  Cassirer’s  less  encumbered  vision,  and
Hegel’s  decisive  critique  of  Kant  may,  once  secured,  encourage  us  to  shed  Hegel’s
unmanageable language for a leaner pragmatist idiom. That’s what I mean by reading
philosophical sources ‘genealogically’: ineluctably, we recast the philosophical gains we
claim to have clinched (for instance, the need to replace Kant’s realism and idealism, as
argued) in accord with the somewhat inchoate ‘rational instinct’ of our form of life – what
I  sometimes  call  our  ‘metaphilosophical  culture,’  from  which,  inventively,  we  draw
evolving arguments. ‘Genealogy’ is the name I give to this effort to bridge philosophy’s
history, ‘meta’-philosophically. I foresee the need to eclipse the classic pragmatists in the
same sense in which we are in the process of eclipsing Kant and Hegel.
18 Here, Mathias Girel has anticipated me. He requires a more straightforward answer to my
intended use of what I call Peirce’s chance motto: “Darwinizing Hegel and Hegelianizing
Darwin.” I suppose I should say that I intend the motto to be read genealogically (in my
own labile way). In fact, Pragmatism Ascendent is no more than a first step in the attempt
to ‘recover’ (or ‘reinvent’) pragmatism, in and for our time, within the genealogical space
spanned by an inspiration drawn from Kant and Hegel and Darwin that, in retrospect, a
dozen years into the 21st century, must turn back to consider what it can now afford to
shed or transform. There’s the point of my realism/Idealism proposal: it cannot be more
than a genealogical argument: it’s a fresh construction, a proposal: post-Kant, post-Hegel, 
post-Darwin, and, I imagine, post-Peirce (and post-Cassirer). Minimally, as Girel remarks,
the motto must signal my guess that pragmatism’s best prospects (also, those of analytic
philosophy, if you allow the distinction) lie in the direction of intertwining “biological
naturalism and the post-Kantian emphasis on history and culture.” I mean that much at
least; though, having completed the book before you, I don’t at all wish to rely on the
potential infelicities of Peirce’s doubts about either Hegel or Darwin. Girel has in a way
forced my hand. I’ve settled, at least in part, my account of Hegel, culminating in the
realism/Idealism proposal. I see no gain in a Hegelian account of (biological) evolution;
though  once  the  problematic  fit  of  human  evolution  within  the  Darwinian  account
becomes clear, the hybrid form of human evolution cannot be gainsaid. I’ve deliberately
left all but untouched the Darwinian issue itself, except to flag “my radical thesis” (which
Girel cites), “that the self is a hybrid artifact of biological and cultural evolution that
makes  possible  the  entire  run  on  the  uniquely  enlanguaged  forms  of  human
intelligence…” and so on. But that’s my prophecy.
19 The topic is still too huge to take on in the present context: it’s part of what I hope will be
the start of a new undertaking, centered on the human self. The novel intertwining of the
Hegelian and the Darwinian is anticipated there: in the analysis of culture and history
along post-Hegelian lines,  explicated in terms of the advantages of the realist/Idealist
proposal, which suggests (to my mind) a new way of construing the ‘unity of the sciences’;
also, then, in the analysis of the formation and functioning of the self itself, explicated in
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terms of the advantages of the artifactuality thesis, pursued along post-Darwinian line.
Actually, Darwin has rather little to contribute to the argument directly; my genealogical
sources here have more in common with the work of the philosophical anthropologists
(who can be wild in their own way) and with the paleoanthrology and paleontology of
Homo sapiens within the genus. So I may have misled Girel. At any rate, that’s the reason I
don’t attempt to recover Peirce’s meaning. The book ends in a promissory note, but this
intent makes sense only if  we do not return to the separate strands of Hegelian and
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